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Abstract 
Formal credit market or financial sector seems to be inefficient in its current form to provide credit to the poor households 
despite it providing wide range of financial services, particularly credit, in Kenya. There is, therefore, a need to address this 
problem so as to improve access to credit thereby improving the living standards of the households. The current paper aim at 
assessing the effect of group lending on micro credit accessibility among the low income households living in rural and sub-
urban regions of Keiyo south district. Game theory is applied in study to intuit how group borrowers play the microfinance 
game with the microfinance institution. This study adopted an explanatory and exploratory design. This study was conducted 
in Keiyo South District in Kenya; the target population was members of Women Organizations. Data for the study was 
obtained using structured questionnaires. Analysis of data was done using descriptive statistics specifically mean and 
standard deviation. Multiple regression analysis was used to test hypothesis. Study findings indicated that joint liability and 
more group diversity enhances accessibility of credit in group lending. However, group size does not determine accessibility 
of credit in group lending.  
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Introduction  
Access to credit plays a significant role in the lives of the poor households, particularly those that are plagued by financial 
shocks like illness and funerals. This role is central to contemporary debates surrounding strategies for poverty reduction and 
economic development. The majority of the people in Kenya live in informal settlements and/or rural areas where poverty is 
still rife. Wilson (2006) points out that some survive below the minimum poverty level, usually the equivalent of US $1 per 
day. This makes these people to be exposed to even minor shocks which have detrimental effects on them (Johnson and 
Rogaly, 1997). It is, therefore, difficult for the poor households to survive in the long run. According to Giné and Karlan 
(2006), the different features of group and individual lending schemes have not yet been studied in detail despite being a 
question of first order importance. Currently, the households find it difficult to access credit from the formal credit market 
due to the asymmetric information problem associated with adverse selection and moral hazard (Karlan and Zinman 2008). 
This problem restricts access to credit and discourages the market from servicing the poor households who are regarded as 
unprofitable and risky. Improving access to credit and removing the constraints that have deterred the households from 
accessing credit can assist them to cushion themselves against the effects of financial shocks, thus reducing their 
vulnerability, poverty, and improving their living standards in general (Cassar et al, 2007).  The poor households, therefore, 
resort to group lending as an insurance mechanism of sorting between risky and non-risky members and to enforce and 
monitor contracts and regular payments. Studies show that the persistence of social interactions among informal groups as a 
way of improving social capital and deepening friendships and the benefits of contributing money together give the 
households a head start in their financial status (Whiteford and McGrath, 2000). 
 
One innovation to extend credit to the poor that simultaneously addresses the asymmetric information problem and 
enforcement concerns lies in group lending; lending to self-selected groups of entrepreneurs who are jointly liable for a loan. 
Groups form voluntarily, and, while loans are made to individual in the group, all members of the group are held responsible 
for loan repayment by the entire group. (Karlan 2011) stressed group lending’s informational and enforcement advantages 
over individual lending. Since group members are jointly liable for loan repayment, group lending can achieve better 
screening to dilute adverse selection, induces peer monitoring to contend moral hazard and provides group members with 
incentives to enforce loan repayments (Ghatak, 2000). 
 
Numerous theoretical papers have addressed the positive effects of group lending mechanisms. Ghatak (2000) show that 
group lending achieves self−selection of borrowers and acts as a screening device. Armendáriz de Aghion and Gollier (2000) 
find that even if borrowers do not know each other’s type, group lending may be feasible due to lower interest rates as a 
result of cross subsidization of borrowers. Laffont and N’Guessan (2000) conclude that social connections facilitate the 
monitoring and enforcement of joint liability loan contracts. This result has been confirmed in an empirical study by Karlan 
(2007). Furthermore, Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch(2000) point to a fall in transaction costs when instead of 
individual visits of clients group meetings are held. In addition, the contact with banks to which poor borrowers typically are 
not used to is facilitated. However, certain drawbacks of group lending exist. Giné and Karlan (2006) state that the demand 
for credit within a group may change over time, forcing clients with small loans to be liable for larger loans of their peers. 
Furthermore, the growth of group lending programs may slow down when new borrowers with looser social ties enter and, 
consequently, the group lending technology loses some of its power. 
If group members do not have complete information about each other, then group lending may not lead to any improvements 
in loan repayment rates. This has also been shown in Laffont and N’Guessan (2000) that the burden of moral hazard problem 
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between a borrowing member and the lender falls on the monitoring members who are responsible for repaying the loan of 
the defaulting member. They show that with an increasing cost of monitoring, a monitor can impose higher penalties on the 
borrowing member in the case of default, giving the borrowing member an incentive to choose a safer project. 
 
In spite of the dynamic formal credit market or financial sector which provides a wide range of financial services, particularly 
credit, in Kenya, the sector seems to be inefficient in its current form to provide credit to the poor households (Faulu, 2010). 
Only 1.5 percent of SMEs receive loans from commercial banks in Kenya (International Centre for Economic Growth 2009). 
It is unclear, how the rest, who form the majority, meet their working and investment needs (Kimuyu and Omiti, 2000). 
Perhaps this is not surprising in light of the magnitude of barriers that they face in accessing credit. Lack of tangible security 
by SMEs, the limited capacity, outreach and linkages by financial intermediaries and a hostile legal and regulatory 
framework for financial services are the main constraints (Government of Kenya 2005). Yet there is little information as to 
how the few SMEs that access formal credit manage to do so in light of this very difficult environment.   
There is, therefore, a need to address this problem so as to improve access to credit thereby improving the living standards of 
the households. The inability of the poor to meet the collateral requirements stipulated by banks and the inherently high cost 
by banks to screen and monitor the actions of the poor and to enforce loan contracts may all contribute to the exclusion of the 
poor from the credit market. One innovation for extending credit to the poor lies in group lending − lending to a self-selected 
group of borrowers.  
 
The question would then be the extent to which micro-credit has been utilized and whether or not has it empowered the low 
income household. Unfortunately, many studies stress the financial aspects of micro-credit ignoring the social aspects which 
affect access and utilization of small loans such as; the borrowers; poverty, perceptions and attitudes, the outcome of using 
micro-loan on the household wellbeing and gender relations in credit utilization. Important to note is that, knowledge of 
group lending as a mechanism to credit accessibility in both rural and urban households remains only partial and contestable. 
Consequently, a sociological analysis of group lending programs remains an important field of study: to point out whether the 
group lending had contributed to access to credit facilities and poverty alleviation. The above plethora issues and many others 
were very pertinent to me and inspirational to carry out this study. Therefore, this study seek to address the impact of group 





Extent to which group-based lending can minimize the asymmetry of information problem depends among other things on 
the optimal group size. Certain programs using VB models in Latin American and West African countries use larger group 
sizes to the detriment of their efficiency. In certain Burkina Faso programs Paxton (1996), and MkNelly and Kevane (2002) 
observed that large sized groups usually face free riding problems, where some group members hide behind the large group 
to dodge monitoring and other responsibilities. 
Free-riding incentives may depend crucially on the size of the borrowing groups. In practice, it is unclear how far group size 
affects repayment rates. FINCA, the organization which pioneered the village banking concept, lends to large borrower 
groups of between 10 and 50 members, and boasts repayment rates of 96%. On the other hand, Grameen prefers smaller 
groups with typically only five members, in order to keep free-riding and in-group coordination problems under control. In 
the academic literature, both positions have their advocates. Ghatak and Guinnane (1999) argue that despite the insurance 
effect of larger groups, smaller groups are to be preferred for their better in-group co-ordination and reduced level of free-
riding. On the other hand, Buckley (1996) empirically finds that groups with ten or more members still can work effectively. 
 
Ahlin, & Townsend, (2007) constructed a stylised MFI scenario. To study free-riding behaviour connected to group lending, 
they modeled a situation in which repayment depends on group solidarity alone. To implement dynamic incentives, follow-up 
loans are subject to full repayment in the past. In their experiment each member of a group of n players invests in an 
individual risky project. Whether the project succeeds is known only to the individual investor. Subjects decide individually 
whether or not to contribute to the group repayment. However, only those with successful projects are able to contribute. The 
experiment ends if too few contribute, that is, if the group as a whole cannot fulfil its repayment obligation. They focused on 
three instrumental variables identified as crucial for MFI success: (1) The group size, which we set to n = 2, n = 4, and n = 8 
in three conditions, (2) the dynamic incentive structure, and (3) the intensity of social ties between group members.  
 
They observed a high and robust performance of group lending institutions in all their treatments. In fact repayment rates are 
generally higher than those achievable by individual lending. While individual contribution rates decrease slightly with larger 
groups, the impact of free-riding is alleviated by the greater dispersion of risks. They clearly identified the importance of 
dynamic incentives. Towards the end of the experiment repayment rates decrease substantially.  
 
HO1: group size has no significant effect on accessibility of micro credit. 
Joint Liability on Accessibility of Micro Credit 
There are two major factors involved in the joint liability for a lender to consider understanding and overcoming the adverse 
selection. Firstly is to find the type of group i.e. whether the group belongs to high risk or lower risk. Secondly the formation 
of the group whether risk is heterogeneous or risk is homogeneous among group members. The interest rates charged would 
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be depending on the riskiness of the group. Higher the group riskiness higher interest rates are charged. Hence the safe 
members would be inclined towards the formation of the group with the safe members than with the risky members in order 
to prevent from paying the installments of defaulting members. This leads to the risky individual to form the group with the 
risky individual and hence the interest rates charged is higher. Laffont (2003) paper finds that provision of the 
communication and information flow between the group members would lead to the optimum levels of rental paid by the 
banks to the members at the same time would be able to successfully overcome the adverse selection problems and provides 
right interest rates to group loans. However in the absence of the information flow due to lack of social collusiveness would 
lead to the performance which will be no different from the performance of an individual loan scheme. 
 
Ahlin& Townsend (2007) paper explain Joint liability has been better functioning when the group members who are highly 
familiar and also ready to punish the member on default. However not every culture would have the same phenomena and 
hence the group credit with joint liability will be successful only in the communities who would be interested in punish rather 
than looking at the individual preference. The joint liability scheme also fails when group members find that the other 
members are defaulting irrespective of monitoring. Then the rest of the members would also default as they would be rejected 
the further loan irrespective of present performance. At the same time in the cases of the presence of the insurance for the 
loan portfolio would also encourage the clients to involve in the higher risk projects and less concerned towards the 
repayment of the loans as described by Karlan (2005). 
 
The low risk project members would be forming the group with the low risk members as due to the high conformity of 
certain cash flows in the projects and hence the regular repayments whereas in the case of the risky members the probability 
of failure of the projects is high and hence the group members have high risk in repayment of the instalments. However in the 
case of risky projects, returns are high and hence the successful member would be ready to pay higher repayments. Hence 
there is clear formation of the same risk customers in the same group. This would help in providing the lower risk groups 
with lower interest rates and higher risk group with higher interest rates as detailed by Ghatak (1999). Ghatak (2000) adds a 
point that the formation of the groups on the basis of homogeneous risk is also said as the positive assortative matching. 
 
Majority of the funding agencies have continuously used termination threat i.e. on partial or total default of the instalment 
payment by a group member or members would lead to further loan provision to all the members of the group. The second 
channel of management of the enforcement of the repayment is by group characteristics establishment as provided by 
Wenner (1995): Social and cultural cohesion formed in the group provides the peer pressure on an individual to repay the 
installments without default. The leadership of the group leader also impact upon the repayments. As they help in the 
commitment in the surplus resources by all the members in case of default scenario.  Finally the group size also impacts the 
leadership and the social and cultural cohesion of the total group.  
 
The collusion between the group members may lead to the negative impact on the performance of the loan and hence lender 
could be at a risk of losing the portfolio. However the lender would be able to make optimum level of returns only when the 
group credit is provided and the information flow is between the members. At the same time the members need to monitor 
and enforce the commitment to each member. Hence the group credit would perform better over the individual credit scheme 
as due to the group skills in monitoring and enforcement in repayments as described by Laffont& Rey (2003). 
 
HO1: joint liability has no significant effect on accessibility of micro credit. 
 
Group Diversity on Accessibility of Micro Credit 
It is well documented that a group’s composition can affect its borrowing strength, but the exact nature of diversity’s impact 
remains the subject of debate (see Mannix& Neale, 2005). The most frequently mentioned negative outcome of diversity 
broadly defined is interpersonal conflict which leads to default in paying the loan and this makes the lender to deny loan to 
the group (see De Dreu&Weingart, 2003). More specifically, various types of heterogeneity can reduce the quantity and 
quality of group communication (Maznevski, 1994; Zenger & Lawrence, 1989) as well as predict decreases in group 
cohesion and morale, outcomes that in turn lead members to seek alternative groups or to simply drop out (Jackson, 1992; 
McCain, O’Reilly, & Pfeifer, 1983; O’Reilly, Caldwell, & Barnett, 1989). The potential negative impact of diversity is not 
limited to morale in obtaining loan but can also be seen in a group’s actual loan repayment (Ancona& Caldwell, 1992; 
DeBiasio, 1986; Mullen & Copper, 1994). 
 
However, as Moreland, Levine, and Wingert (1996) have pointed out, deleterious effects on loan repayments are most likely 
under certain circumstances, such as, when the decision requires convergent thinking or when heterogeneity also leads to 
variability in group members’ abilities. 
 
Sharma and Zeller (1998) analyze the repayment rates of 128 credit groups belonging to three group-based credit programs in 
Bangladesh: the Association for Social Advancement (ASA), the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC), and 
the RangpurDinajpur Rural Service (RDRS). They studied group size, size of loans, degree of loan rationing, enterprise mix 
within groups, demographic characteristics, social ties and status, and occurrence of idiosyncratic shocks. It is concluded that 
if basic principles of prudential banking are adhered to, repayment rates can be good even in poor and remote communities. 
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The important thing for financial institutions is to tailor services such that it becomes worthwhile for the poor to establish a 
profitable long-term association. In addition, more freedom to members in the process of group formation is recommended.  
Micro-finance programs provide poor people with small loans given to jointly liable self-selected groups. Follow-up loans 
provide incentives to repay. Abbink et al. (2006) show the influence of those features on strategic default. They investigate 
group size and social ties effects and observe robust high repayment rates. Group lending out-performs individual lending. 
Self-selected groups show high but less stable contributions. Gomez and Santor (2003) present evidence in favor of the 
positive effects of informational and relational social capital on group loan repayment.  
 
Ahlin and Townsend‟s (2007’s estimation results support the group self-selection models in the wealthier central region near 
Bangkok, and the models emphasi-zing the importance of social sanctions in the poorer, northeastern Thailand. Yet the fact 
that they find strong social ties within borrowing groups to be negatively corre-lated with group repayment causes them to 
challenge the idea that group lending works through its ability to harness all types of existing social capital.  
Abbink et al. (2006) carry out a conventional lab experiment in which students in the social sciences at the University of 
Erfurt participate in a microfinance game. Their results show that social ties within groups induce higher, but less stable, 
group loan repayment and that the performance of borrowing groups with initially weak social ties may grow with experience 
together in group loan repayment. Gine e´t al. (2005) find evidence that group lending may actually induce moral hazard 
(through risk-taking and free-riding) rather than reduce it; though group self-selection counteracts some of these problems. 
HO1: group diversity  has no significant effect on accessibility of micro credit. 
 
Theoretical Frameworks  
Game theory is applied to intuit how group borrowers play the microfinance game with the microfinance institution. From a 
theoretical perspective, the initial positive results from the group lending experience are puzzling.   The group lending 
mechanism described by Yunus (1998) is vulnerable to moral hazard problems.  In particular, free-riding by individual group 
members and collusive behavior by the whole group against the financial institution. The group-based borrowers played the 
lending game according to the rules set out by the microfinance institution. However, as play ensued, groups become savvier 
on how to play the game to their advantage. Therefore, while group liability is used to harness the cooperative relationship 
among the members of the group to the advantage of the microfinance institution, in time, these same cooperative 
relationships are used to collude against the bank.  That  is,  groups  begin  to  make  riskier  investments  to  increase  their  
expected  payout.  This eventually results in reduced loan repayment rates and a consequent change in the lending practices 
of the microfinance institution. Specifically, once players know the expected payoffs from their investment choices, the 
optimal investment strategy for the group is to make at least one risky investment for which the probability of loan repayment 
is less than one. And, once the group engages in a risky investment strategy, they are more likely to continue to choose risky 
investments for the balance of the game. 
Conceptual Framework 
Joint liabilities refer to when two or more persons are liable in respect of the same liability, in most common law legal 
systems they may either be:jointly liable, orseverally liable, orjointly and severally liable. Group size refers to number of 
members within a group. Group members’ education refer to education possessed members of the group such as education 








Source: Research Study (2014) 
Figure 1Conceptual Framework 
 
METHODOLOGY 
This study adopted an explanatory and exploratory design. This is because the research is a cause-effect relationship. This 
design is best for investigating the effect group lending on accessibility of credit.This study was conducted in Keiyo South 
District in Kenya; the target populations were members of Women Organization from 779 groups. The study used Nassiuma, 
(2000) sample size formula to get 179 groups.  Random sampling was used in this study to select groups and subsequently 
the members. From sample random sampling was done to select the participating group. Three members were then randomly 
selected from the identified groups. The primary data for the study was obtained using structured questionnaires.  
 
Joint liability  
 
Group size  
 
Group diversity  
 
Accessibility of micro credit  
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 Analysis of data was done using descriptive statistics specifically mean and standard deviation. Inferential statistics were 
Pearson correlation coefficient and multiple regression analysis. The multiple regression models was explained as follows.  
𝑦 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑋1 + 𝛽2𝑋2+𝛽3𝑋3 + 𝜀………………………………1 
Where; 
y- This is accessibility of credit. 
α -This is the constant of an equation. 
𝑋1 = join liability  
𝑋2 = group size 
𝑋3 = group diversity  
β1, β2, β3, β4, – These are the coefficient of regression for independent variables. 
𝜀 – This is random error term. 
Findings  
Study results in table 1 reveals that joint liability was positively correlated to accessibility of credit (Pearson product-moment 
correlation = -.388), this correlation between joint liability and accessibility of credit was indicated to be significant at 0.01 
(confidence interval), hence we infer that there is positive significant relationship between joint liability and accessibility of 
credit. In addition,group size was revealed to be positively correlated to accessibility of credit (Pearson product-moment 
Correlation = 0.761), this relationship was strong and significant at 0.01 confidence interval. Moreover,group diversity was 
also positively correlated to accessibility of credit (Pearson product-moment Correlation = 0.705), this relationship was also 
strong and significant at 0.01 confidence level.  
 









liability group size 
group 
diversity 
accessibility of credit 2.16 0.729 1 
   joint liability 3.52 0.677 0.388** 1 
  group size 3.89 0.506 .761** 0.032 1 




Study findings in table 2 revealed that 22 percent variation of accessibility of credit is explained by joint liability, group size 
and group diversity as supported by R2 = 0.22. Durbin Watson test showed that there was no autocorrelation among the 
variable as indicated by Durbin Watson value =0.713 which was less than 2 thumb rule. Study results in table 2 revealed that 
F value 13.039, with p value = 0.000 significant at 0.05, this implies that the joint prediction of aforementioned independent 
variables of accessibility of credit is significant. This shows that the model can be used in future to predict accessibility of 
credit. Moreover, findings showed non-existence of multicollinearity. 
 
The results also showed that joint liability had a significant effect on accessibility of credit (β1= 0.175, ρ>0.05) thus the 
hypothesis was not accepted.This infers that there is an increase in accessibility of credit by 0.175 units with an increase in 
joint liability. In conformity with the findings of the study,Ahlin& Townsend (2007) state that joint liability works best when 
group members are highly familiar and ready to punish the members on default. However, joint liability is ineffective when 
groups are defaulting despite monitoring. In such a case, default on loan repayment would reduce the chances of further loan 
provision. Similarly,Wenner (1995) found out that group characteristics such as social and cultural cohesion in the group 
provides the peer pressure on an individual to repay the instalments without default. 
 
Furthermore, the findings showed that group size had significant effect on accessibility of credit (β2 = 0.088, ρ<0.05). Thus 
the hypothesis was rejected. This indicates that there is an increase in accessibility of credit by 0.088 units with an increase in 
group size. Cognate to the results,Ahlin, & Townsend, (2007) echo that repayments rates for groups is higher compared to 
those achievable by individual lenders. Similarly,Abbink et al. (2006) observe that being in a group increases the chances of 
accessing credit since groups have observed high repayment rates.   However,Paxton et al (1996) observed that large sized 
groups are faced with free riding problems whereby some members some members hide behind the group to dodge 
monitoring. In so doing, the high and robust repayment rate is deterred due to lack of coordination and free-riding. 
 
Finally, the study showed that group diversity had significant and positive effect on accessibility of credit (β3 = 0.385, 
ρ<0.05). Therefore, the study rejected the hypothesis. This indicates that there is an increase in accessibility of credit by 
0.385 units with an increase in group diversity. Contrary to the findings,Ahlin and Townsend‟s (2007) confirm that through 
group diversity, all types of existing social capital are harnessed thereby creating strong social ties which is detrimental to 
accessibility of credit due to low repayment. Similarly,De Dreu&Weingart, (2003) are also in disagreement with the findings 
of the study since they mention that group diversity is associated with interpersonal conflict which leads to default in paying 
the loan and this makes the lender to deny loan to the group. 
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Table 2 multiple regression results  
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients Standardized Coefficients Collinearity Statistics 
 
B Std. Error Beta T Sig. Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) 2.944 1.844 
 
1.596 0.112 
  joint liability 2.371 0.786 0.175 3.019 0.003 0.837 1.194 
group size -0.35 0.214 -0.088 -1.632 0.104 0.967 1.034 
group diversity  1.963 0.271 0.385 7.237 0.000 0.997 1.003 
R Square 0.22 
      Adjusted R Square 0.203 
      Durbin-Watson 0.713 
      F 13.039 
      Sig. .000b 
      a Dependent Variable: accessibility of credit  
     
Conclusion 
There is overwhelming evidence from the study showing that joint liability has a positive and significant influence on 
accessibility of credit. Particularly, the interest rates on loans are charged according to riskiness. As such, low risk members 
are inclined to form groups with low risk project members due to conformity with regular repayments. In the case of risky 
members, the probability of the failure of the project is usually high thus group members have high risk in repayment of the 
instalments. For risky projects, returns are usually high hence successful members are ready to pay higher repayments. This 
infers that low risk members are likely to access credit compared to high risk members since they conform to regular 
repayment. 
 
The findings of the study have also established that the group size is positively associated with accessibility of credit. 
Consequently, the repayment period for group lenders is desirable compared to individual lenders. Therefore, group lenders 
are likely to access credit. Nonetheless, large sized groups are impaired by free riding problems whereby certain members 
dodge responsibilities and monitoring leading to low repayment rates. 
 
Finally, group diversity is also associated with increased accessibility of credit. Precisely, group diversity harnesses all types 
of existing social capital thereby enhancing group loan repayment. However, strong social ties creates the problem of low 
loan repayment which reduces accessibility of credit. Furthermore, there is also interpersonal conflict associated with group 
diversity which leads to default in loan repayment thereby reducing the access to credit. 
 
Recommendations 
The findings of the study have established that joint liability impacts positively on accessibility of credit. There is therefore 
need for clear formation of the same risk customers in the same group. In the case of risky projects, returns are usually high 
hence the need for higher repayments. In so doing, lower risk groups would be provided with low interest rates while higher 
risk group would be provided with higher interest rates. The results of this study have also delivered insights on the effect of 
group size on accessibility of credit. As a result, there is need for smaller groups in order to curtail free-riding and in-group 
coordination problems. The problem of free-riding can also be controlled by greater dispersion of risks within the group. It is 
also preferable to borrow as a group rather than as an individual since repayments rates in groups is higher. This way 
accessibility of credit will be enhanced.  Since group diversity is key in enhancing access to credit, there is need to enhance 
social cohesion so as to reduce interpersonal conflict which is a cause of low access to credit. Interpersonal conflict can also 
be controlled through enhancing more freedom to members in the process of group formation. Also, there is need to provide 
groups with follow up loans since such loans offer the incentives to repay. For further research,including moderator factors 
and looking forward to direct or indirect relationship towards access to credit can also be made by scholars in future. 
Furthermore, conducting a replication study in another District is also needed so as to come up with conclusive results of the 
impact of group size, group diversity and joint liability on access to credit. 
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